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The Chilean energy transition has been internationally recognized as a case of
successful public policy in the promotion of renewable energies, even being defined
as an “energy revolution”. However, a preliminary analysis of the process allow us
to sustain that the incorporation of non-conventional renewable sources to the energy
matrix has not modified the technocratic model ofmarket-based management, the
ownership structure of the projects, nor has it implied an advance towards
democratic and decentralized energy systems that promote local development and the
effective participation of communities in energy decision-making. It is concluded
that the socio-technical process of the Chilean energy transition has given rise to a
post-political energy condition, and that behind the technological success and
consensus around the transition there is a perpetuation of power relations and
structures of capitalist appropriation and management of energy resources.
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1. Introduction
Chile is characterized by being an energy importer, highly dependent on hydropower and
external energy sources, with limited fossil energy sources and a highly centralized and
privatized energy system (CNE 2008; Min. Energía 2014; Proaño 2015; Furnaro 2019;
Simsek et al. 2019; O’Ryan, Nasirov, and Álvarez 2020). The multiple problems that
this has caused in the country, together with the consensus, discourses and international
agreements on the effects of climate change, have allowed the energy discussion to be posi-
tioned as a central axis of the public policies of recent governments, which has implied an
apparent “re-politicization” of energy as an issue area. This has been reflected in the pro-
motion of long-term measures to encourage the incorporation of generation sources based
on non-conventional renewable energies (NCRE)1 in the energy matrix with the intention
of exploiting the country’s renewable energy potential (Min. Energy 2014, 2016; Govern-
ment of Chile 2015; Nasirov et al. 2018, 2019; Pacheco 2018; Simsek et al. 2019). Prelimi-
nary figures show that the regulations and public policies promoted have been successful,
since they show a constant and exponential increase in the participation of this type of
sources in the electricity matrix (especially solar and wind) in the short and medium
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term (REN21 2016; Nasirov et al. 2018; Pacheco 2018; CNE 2020a, 2020b). This has led
to the Chilean case being presented in the international scenario as an example to follow in
terms of the promotion of renewable energies by the State and its public policies.2 Former
EnergyMinister Máximo Pacheco has even argued that what has happened since 2014 with
the implementation of energy policies and regulations represents a true “energy revolution”
(Pacheco 2018).
However, behind the consensus on the need to modify traditional patterns -associated
with an energy matrix based on fossil sources that incorporate renewables-, is the fact that
the so-called Chilean energy transition has not meant a real decrease in the participation of
fossil fuels in the electrical and primary matrix, a reduction in GHG emissions, nor a sub-
stantial modification in terms of the characteristic features that make up the socio-political
context of a concentrated, centralized and scarcely participatory and inclusive energy
system. Then it is necessary to question why a transition process that is presented as revo-
lutionary has failed to allow the promotion of new energy paradigms more democratic and
decentralized and move towards a true transformation of the energy sector.
Recent studies on the process of Chilean energy transition promoted since 2014 have
focused mostly on the analysis of the conditions to explain and maintain the future growth
of renewable energies (Nasirov et al. 2018, 2019; Simsek et al. 2019), the projections and
patterns of GHG emissions from the energy sector for meeting mitigation targets (O’Ryan
et al. 2019, 2020; Osorio-Aravena et al. 2020), or the role that demand side management
could play within the transition (Valdés et al. 2019). These studies adopt a mainly techno-
cratic approach by analyzing the stimulus policies and market–based mechanisms that
explain the advance towards a lower emission energy matrix, but without addressing a
crucial aspect in energy transitions such as power and the power relations that underlie
and determine these processes. In parallel to these trends, research has emerged that has
sought to reveal the shortcomings of the supposed participatory approach or participatory
turn in the context of the new public energy policy (Ureta 2017; Alvial-Palavicino and
Opazo-Bunster 2018; Urquiza et al. 2018), and its neoliberal character and functional to
the reproduction of the regimes of accumulation in the mining sector (Furnaro 2019).
The development of further research that feeds the critical study on the processes of
energy transition and its results is crucial for its proper understanding if we consider
that these are fundamentally political processes that not only involve changes in energy
infrastructure systems, but also in the social sphere, specifically over the power relations
that configure the socio-technical order relative to the energy sector (Avelino and
Rotmans 2009; Meadowcroft 2009; Mitchell 2011; Laird 2013; Boyer 2014; Szeman
2014; Avelino et al. 2016; Bues and Gailing 2016; Gailing 2016). On this basis, during
the last years the studies linked to the processes of energy transition have advanced in
the theorization of the role of power relations in the configuration of the varied dimensions
of the energy resources, which used to be treated from a predominantly technical focus
(Avelino and Rotmans 2009; Hendriks 2009; Meadowcroft 2009; Avelino et al. 2016;
Avelino and Wittmayer 2016; Gailing 2016; Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016; Healy and
Barry 2017; Burke and Stephens 2018). This has allowed progress towards a deeper under-
standing of the relationship between society and energy, generating more critical analyses
of the existence of disparate patterns of use and access among different social stakeholders.
To this end, conceptual approaches such as depoliticization (Bues and Gailing 2016; Kenis,
Bono, and Mathijs 2016; Kuzemko 2016), studies of governability (Bues and Gailing
2016; Gailing 2016) and dispositive thinking (Gailing 2016), among other theoretical
and methodological frameworks have been incorporated into the study of energy transition
processes.
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On this basis, the objective of this paper is to contribute to the study of power dynamics in
the context of the Chilean energy transition based on the theoretical development linked to
the concept of depoliticization. This, in order to explain how the incorporation of the energy
thematic as central theme of public policy, has contradictorily gone hand in hand with the
perpetuation of a depoliticized framework and a neoliberal energy model oriented in the
market, sustained in the consensus and discourse of the advance of renewable energies.
For this purpose, a methodological framework is elaborated based on the investigations
that have used the concept of depoliticization for the study of the transition processes.
Mainly, research on depoliticization has been used in general as a framework of analy-
sis to explain the causes and effects of the prevalence of neoliberal thinking in domestic
politics (Burnham 2000; Silva 2004, 2006; Hay 2007; Jenkins 2011; Wood and Flinders
2014). Subsequent developments have begun to employ this approach to investigate
energy issues specifically. For example by Bues and Gailing (2016) to study cases of
implementation of the German Energiwende, by Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs (2016) to elu-
cidate the post-political character of the “Transition Mangement” approach in the Belgian
and Dutch context and by Kuzemko (2014, 2016) for the UK case study. The concept of
depoliticization offers a valuable approach for the critical study of energy transitions, as it
focuses on the dynamics of political decision-making by analyzing the logics and strategies
of inclusion and/or exclusion of certain actors, interests and perspectives in the debate on
the definition and implementation of possible energy futures.
After this introduction, the following section outlines the concept of depoliticization
and the related approaches that have been developed to study power relations within the
context of energy transitions. This in order to propose a methodological framework to
analyze the Chilean case. Next, both the process of the Chilean energy system prior to
the start of the energy transition, as well as public policies and the central elements that
characterize the process of the so-called transition or Chilean revolution, are analyzed
based on the forms or faces of depoliticization identified. After a section of discussion
from the central findings, by way of conclusion the article shows the contribution that
the theoretical approaches exposed to the analysis and conceptualization of the process
of Chilean energy transition.
2. Politization, depoliticization and the post-Political condition of energy
Energy transitions do not only involve changes in technological features and infrastructure
of energy systems, but also in the social sphere, specifically over the power relations that
configure the socio-technical order relative to the energy sector, which are decisive deter-
minants within these processes. Energy transitions are inherently political processes that
can transform social and cultural relations and structures and constitute a possibility of
advancing towards more democratic models of energy development, but that can also
reflect and reinforce existing power relations (Avelino and Rotmans 2009; Meadowcroft
2009; Mitchell 2011; Stirling 2014; Avelino et al. 2016; Brand 2016; Bues and Gailing
2016; Gailing 2016; Burke and Stephens 2018; Köhler et al. 2019; Brand, Görg, and
Wissen 2020).
The need to re-politicize the analysis of socio technical and energy transitions is con-
tingent, since parallel to the incorporation of the problems associated with climate change
and its consequences into the sphere of public policies, a political condition has been con-
solidated evacuating the debate on these matters from the space of public discussion, repla-
cing it with a framework of expert consensualism reserved for political-intellectual elites
(Swyngedouw 2010). This process of de-politicization of environmental issues has
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given rise to the structuring of a post-political condition, where ideological disputes and
struggles are replaced by techno-management planning, expert management and interme-
diation of interests (Zizek 1999, 2008; Mouffe 2000, 2005; Rancière 2006; Swyngedouw
2010). Depoliticization is thus the mechanism for the annulment of politics and the ten-
dency to promote thinking focused on consensus and a technical and managerial way of
looking at politics (Kenis and Lievens 2014; Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016). This, ignor-
ing the fact that all consensuses are the temporary result of a provisional hegemony, which
in itself implies dynamics of exclusion (Mouffe 2000, 2013).
This post-political framework, is structured around the dominant perception of the
inevitability of capitalism and the market economy as the basic organizational structure
of society, that will allow dealing with the socio-environmental crisis through privatization
and commodification of CO2, carbon-trading and emission-offsetting (Swyngedouw
2010).3 This ambivalence of the apparent processes of politicization behind which are
hidden mechanisms of depoliticization strengthening a post-political condition is based
on the distinction between the concepts of “the political” and “politics”. Politics refers
to the institutionalist or social spaces that we usually associate with the development of
the activities of exercise of political power as the parliament, elections, or municipalities.
On the other hand, the concept of “the political” refers to the recognition and visibility of
the existence of conflict, power, antagonism and opposition that is typical of any decision-
making process (Mouffe 2005, 2013).
In the Chilean context, the approaches to depoliticization have been developed by
Patricio Silva, who describes the project of depoliticization of society initiated by the mili-
tary government (1973–1990) and continued by the governments of the Concertación
(1990–2010) in order to maintain political stability and facilitate the process of national
reconciliation (Silva 1991, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011). For this author the Chilean case is
unique in Latin America because of the conscious and tenacious way in which the objec-
tive of political deactivation was pursued through the application of orthodox neo-liberal
policies and the primacy of the technocratic and market approach. The integration of the
technocratic ideology within the democratic idea in Chile, has allowed the maintenance
of this condition in democratic governments. This mix has formed a growing “technocratic
democracy” in which social problems are translated into technical terms, making depoliti-
cization a central feature of the Chilean model (Silva 2006).
Bues and Gailing (2016) have used the concept of depoliticization to analyze the
empirical case of renewable energy production in the German state of Brandenburg.4
These authors indicate that the concept offers an approach to analyze the openness of
the discussion regarding the definition of the direction of the transitions. They indicate
that as they are politicized processes they should be shaped by discussion and deliberation
on the possible features of the transition process and its outcomes, being at stake the exten-
sion or limitation of the scope of the possible (Bues and Gailing 2016, 78, 90). They add
that the study of depoliticization offers ground on which an agency-based conceptualiz-
ation of power can be operationalized for the study of power shift in energy transition
(Bues and Gailing 2016, 79). For their study they refer to the following types of depoliti-
cization elaborated by Wood and Flinders (2014) from the categories of Hay (2007): a)
Governmental depoliticization (or delegation); b) Societal depoliticization (privatization);
and c) Discursive depoliticization (or denial) (Bues and Gailing 2016, 77).
In short, governmental depoliticization involves dynamics in which governmental
public policy issues are left to public-private structures or technical bodies, limiting
public scrutiny of their decisions. Societal depoliticization is linked to the transfer of
issues from the public sphere directly to the private sphere and logic. Discursive
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depoliticization marks the shift of issues from the public sphere to the “realm of necessity”,
making human agency illusory as in the case of the discourse on the imperative of energy
transition (Bues and Gailing 2016, 77). In their study on the German energy transition
they point to the technocratic decisions taken by regional planning agencies in the definition
ofwind turbine sites as an example of thefirst form of depoliticization (governmental). As an
example of the second form of depoliticization (societal), the decision on investments and
the use of energy projects is based on investments, owners and private interests. On the
other hand, as an example of the third form of depoliticization (discursive/denial) is pre-
sented the imposition of the discourse of the need to advance in the energy transition
without further discussion or debate on the different patterns of development that it
should follow. To these categories is added a face of depoliticization defined as “repolitici-
zation” that concerns the actions of resistance carried out by the citizenship against the
imposed energy projects and logics (eg: local action groups against win energy develop-
ment, energy cooperatives; political pressure on regional planning) (Bues and Gailing
2016, 89).
In his turn, Kuzemko (2016) applies the depoliticization approach to the study of
energy and climate change policies in the United Kingdom, differentiating between
three forms of depoliticization in terms equivalent to those proposed by Bues and
Gailing. Based on the work of Kay, he proposes the following types or forms of depoliti-
cization: a) marketized depoliticization; b) technocratic depoliticization; and c) non-delib-
erative depoliticization. By marketized depoliticization they mean the delivery of public
affairs by the state to the private sector and the market on similar terms to the societal depo-
liticization of Wood and Flinders (2014) (Kuzemko 2016, 110). Technocratic depoliticiza-
tion, in terms similar to the governmental depoliticization of Wood and Flinders (2014),
refers to the transfer of matters pertaining to formal political deliberation to quasi-public
bodies or independent technical or expert bodies (Kuzemko 2016, 112). Non-deliberative
depoliticization refers to “a lack of open and informed debate and deliberation within and
between actor groups which, in turn, serves to shape and constrain choices” (Kuzemko
2016, 113). This type of depoliticization is assimilated to the discursive depolicization
of Wood and Flinders (2014).
The privatization process in the British electricity market, exemplifies the first type of
depoliticization. As a consequence of this process, it is argued that investment in new elec-
tricity infrastructure, energy security and climate change mitigation measures became
dependent on vertically integrated oligopolistic economic groups, restricting the govern-
ment’s ability to implement new or alternative energy policies (Kuzemko 2016, 113–
116). The technocratic depoliticization is reflected in the delivery of energy decisions to
independent and technical bodies such as the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets,
which sees its capacity for action built to the necessary approval of industry representatives
(Kuzemko 2016, 116–118). Finally, as an example of non-deliberate depoliticization, it
indicates the reductionism of the energy discussion to a technocratic vision on economic
and market variables as a result of the state’s role as a mere regulator of privatized services.
For its part, the work of Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs (2016) critically analyzes the
approach to transition management prevailing in the Dutch and Belgian context. The
authors refer to this approach as a “new and promising way to facilitate the transition to
a more sustainable society” (Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016, 568) denouncing its post-pol-
itical character despite its supposedly radical tone (more information on the Transitions
Management framework in Rotmans, Kemp, and Van Asselt 2001; Loorbach et al.
2010; Köhler et al. 2019). They denounce the dynamics of decision-making in this
context, which is based on a process of dialogue between pre-selected actors that seeks
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to generate an image of consensus on a common future defined and limited ex ante. Their
analysis is based on five considerations: a) “the openness of transition process”, where they
question the preposition of a pre-defined and delimited vision of the common good that
will lead to the adoption of a consensus by making radical dissent invisible and excluded
(Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016, 574–575); b) “the place of the conflict”, which makes
explicit the economic and depoliticized meaning that this approach makes of the conflict
by using it as a mere trigger for innovative transition initiatives (Kenis, Bono, and
Mathijs 2016, 576); c) “the limits of deliberation”, exposing the tendency to ignore and
hide the power relations of the different actors within the deliberative process behind
the concept of interest or common good (Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016, 576–577); d)
“the problem of representation”, linked to the definition of the type of actors who take
part in the process of defining the transition, which focuses on actors with “knowledge”
and a predefined vision of the common good to the detriment of “common citizens”,
and; e) “a (quasi-) market character of the model”, where it is criticized that the discussion
on the transition is circumscribed to the logics of the free market model and the ways to
orient the market dynamics towards social goals through subsidies, taxes or other types
of stimuli (Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016, 579–581).
These methodological frameworks used in the comparative literature to evaluate the
transition processes constitute a basis on which it is possible to analyze the case of the
Chilean energy transition. In first term, as much the previous scenario as that derived
from the implementation of the transition process5 will be evaluated in the light of the cat-
egories or types of depolitization used by Bues and Gailing (2016) and Kuzemko (2016)
adopting mainly the denominations of this last author, that is to say: (a) marketized depo-
liticization (privatization); (b) technocratic depoliticization (delegation); and (c) non-delib-
erative depoliticization (denial). To broaden the focus, the last class of depoliticization
incorporates the five critical considerations used by Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs (2016) to
analyze non-deliberative depoliticization, especially with regard to the public policy that
forms the basis of the Chilean energy transition, such as Energy Policy 2050.
It is necessary to indicate that for the purposes of this work it is understood that the
Chilean energy transition begins in 2014 during the second government of President
Michelle Bachelet. It is in this government where the energy issue becomes a central
theme of public policy and where the short, medium and long-term measures that seek
to reform the energy system are made explicit. This approach begins to be outlined in
the 2014–2018 energy agenda and is embodied in the Energy Roadmap and Energy
Policy 2050 of 2015, which set the tone for the development of regulations and subsequent
public policies. The analysis is based on the study of secondary information sources,
mainly official documents such as policies and reports from public entities and laws, as
well as documentation, reports from public-private entities and NGOs linked to energy
issues in Chile and the literature associated with the Chilean energy transition.
3. Assimilating the energy sector and the Chilean energy transition from the
depoliticization approach
3.1. The basis of marketized Despolitization: the privatization of the energy sector
and its subsequent make-up
The current organic regulation of the energy sector dates back to the time of the military
dictatorship and is part of the neoliberal economic reform program established under
that regime, which covered the entire spectrum of economic policy by reducing the role
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of the state in society and the economy (Bauer 2002, 2004; Silva 2004, 2006; Harvey 2007;
Budds 2009; Tecklin, Bauer, and Prieto 2011; Gárate 2012; Prieto and Bauer 2012; Tironi
and Barandiarán 2014). This vision was enshrined in the Decree with Force of Law (DFL)
No. 4 of 1982 “General Law of Electrical Services” (LGSE).6 The fundamental principles
of this law were: (i) the safe and cost-efficient operation of the electricity system, and; (ii)
the existence of a competitive market in the field of generation-transmission and a price
market in the field of distribution (CNE 2017). The energy policy implemented by the mili-
tary regime gave the State a subsidiary role7 and encouraged the privatization of the elec-
tricity sector, which before the dictatorship was largely controlled by the State (Bauer
2010; Min. Energia 2017).8
The LGSE distinguished three segments of the “electricity market”: generation, trans-
mission and distribution. In the electricity generation sector, a competitive market would
operate with freely negotiated prices for non-regulated customers and regulated tariffs
for “regulated customers”.9 On the other hand, the transmission and distribution sectors
would operate under a natural monopoly system handed over to private operation
(Fischer and Serra 2004; CNE 2017). In this way, the decision of where, how and when
to carry out energy projects was left in the hands of private actors, with the State
playing a role of supervision, referential planning of investments, and analysis and calcu-
lation of prices and tariffs (Min. Energia 2014; Proaño 2015).10
Geographically and operationally, the national energy system was divided into four
separate subsystems. In November 2017 the two main subsystems Northern Interconnected
System (SING) and Central Interconnected System (SIC) were interconnected forming the
National Electric System (SEN) which today represents 99.3% of the total installed
capacity (CNE 2018a). These systems have historically been highly concentrated, which
was to be expected for the transmission and distribution segments operating under
natural monopoly. In the generation segment, which supposedly operates as an open and
competitive market, in 2010, the companies Endesa (currently ENEL), Colbún and
Gener generated and marketed 84% of SIC’s energy, while E-CL, Gas Atacama and
Gener generated and marketed more than 94% of SING’s energy.11
Between 2008 and 2014, several laws were enacted to diversify the energy matrix by
establishing quotas for the injection of non-conventional renewable energy (Law No.
20.257/2008, Law No. 20.689/2013), energy block bidding systems that would encourage
the entry of new players into the market and the lowering of energy prices (Law No.
20.018/2005) and the possibility for users to generate their own energy and inject it into
the grid (Law No. 20.571/2012).12 These laws were successful in terms of promoting
the increase of NCRE in the electricity matrix, but failed in their objective of promoting
a decrease in prices, distributed generation and modifying the oligopolistic structure of
the sector. Thus, the representation of NCRE in the installed electricity capacity increased
from 2% in 2007–5.9% in 2013 (CEN 2014; CNE 2018a, 2018b). In the primary energy
matrix, its representation increased from 0.013% in 2008–0.1% in 2013, with the preva-
lence of fossil sources remaining close to 70%. By 2014 the three largest electricity gen-
eration (Colbún, Endesa & AES Gener) and related companies accounted for 76% of the
installed capacity in SIC while in SING it reaches 98% (Fabra, Montero, and Reguant
2014; CNE 2017).
Under these conditions and in the face of growing conflict and judicialization of hydro-
electric and thermoelectric energy projects (Agostini, Silva, and Nasirov 2017; INDH
2018), the then presidential candidate Michelle Bachelet presents her government pro-
gramme in October 2013. The program proposes to give the State a more active role in
the energy field in order to “aspire to a safe and efficient economic development, with
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reasonable prices, that takes advantage of our renewable resources in a sustainable and
non-polluting way” (Bachelet 2013, 46). Once Michelle Bachelet was for second time
elected President of Chile, and in fulfillment of the promise, in May 2014 the Ministry
of Energy delivered the document “Energy Agenda: A Country Challenge, Progress for
All”. This document established the priority measures and short/medium term energy
focus (2014–2018). The Agenda constituted the first of three steps for the formulation
of the “Energy 2050 Long-Term Energy Policy” which would be followed by the elabor-
ation of the “Roadmap 2050” and the Energy Policy itself (Min. Energia 2015, 22).
On December 30, 2015, the President Bachelet received the document “Energy 2050:
Chile’s Energy Policy” from the Minister of Energy, Máximo Pacheco. The main objective
of the Policy 2050 was to achieve and maintain the reliability of the entire energy system,
while meeting sustainability and inclusion criteria and contributing to the competitiveness
of the country’s economy. In short, bymeans of these attributes, it is established as an objective
to advance towards a sustainable energy in all its dimensions (Min. Energia 2016, 12). The
essential pillar of this policy was the private initiative as an engine of energy development
and a State fulfilled an articulating role of the process as guarantor of the common good
(Min. Energia 2016, 36). Also, it was stated that it was necessary to have prices that favored
the sector’s competitiveness by advancing to a reliable and safe centralized production. It
was also declared the intention that consumers should adopt an active rolewithin amoredecen-
tralized and bidirectional energy system that would approach levels of distributed generation
and demand management similar to the other OECD countries (Min. Energia 2016, 14).
The objectives defined in the new energy policy were the basis for promoting a series of
regulations that, as in the past, sought to stimulate the incorporation of NCRE, lower
energy prices and greater competitiveness in the energy sector. The above, mainly
through the implementation of green taxes (Law No. 20,780/2014), reform the electricity
supply bidding system (Law No. 20,805/2015) and extending the National Petroleum
Company’s (ENAP) business to energy generation activities (Law No. 20,897/2016)
together with a new electricity transmission system (Law No. 20,936/2016).
The bids subsequent to the new regulation managed to lower the prices for the award-
ing of energy blocks for distribution. This, driven by the drop in international prices of
technologies linked to NCRE (52% of the energy tendered in 2016 would come from
NCRE and this percentage reached 100% in 2017). Based on this, a future price drop in
energy accounts is projected (CNE 2017, 2018b).13 At the same time, an increase in the
participation of NCRE in the electrical installed capacity has been observed, which in
January 2020 reached 22.3% (mostly solar photovoltaic with 11%) with 52.1% thermo-
electric and 25.6% conventional hydroelectric (CNE 2020a, 2020b).
However, as in the past, the new measures have not been able to break the oligopolistic
corporate power of the main generation companies, nor have they sought to modify the
market structure in the transmission and distribution sectors. This, despite the fact that
part of the tenders were awarded to new players, the incorporation of the public company
ENAP as a potential energy generator and the new roles granted to the CNE in the expansion
plans of the trunk transmission system (whose construction and operation also remains in
private hands). Notwithstanding the aforementioned incorporation of new actors - all
private- close to 50% of the total of two bids was awarded to Endesa/ENEL (CNE 2017,
2018b). In January 2020, companies of the Chilean Generators Association generated
80% of SEN’s energy. While AES Gener produced 29%, ENEL produced 22%, Colbún
13% and ENGIE 9% (Generators 2020) continuing Chile’s place among the ten countries
with the largest amount of private investment in the international sector (IEA 2018).
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Another concern relates to GHG emission data. According to the latest update by the
Government, GHG emissions from the energy sector increased by 48% between 2010 and
2016 (Gobierno de Chile 2018) while CO2 emissions from SIC-SING in 2015 and 2016
were higher than in 2010 and 2011 (Min. Energia 2018). In this sense; the rapid increase
in the participation of NCRE in the electricity matrix is not so much in the primary matrix
(despite going from 0.5% in 2014–2.8% in 2018), allowing a residual decrease in the par-
ticipation of the most polluting sources such as fossil fuels (68% in 2014, 65% in 2018)
(BNE 2018). Recent studies and projections point to a sustained growth in energy
demand independent of prices, associated with a growth in generation capacity, which
will make it difficult to meet emission reduction targets (O’Ryan et al. 2019, 2020;
Valdés et al. 2019).
In general, both in the scenario prior to the implementation of the “revolutionary” pol-
icies and consequent energy measures promoted from 2014 (Pacheco 2018), the basal
structure that has characterized the Chilean energy sector has been barely modified. In it
-as in the scenario of marketized depoliticization of the United Kingdom described by
Kuzemko (2016)- private market players remain responsible for the provision of energy
goods and services on which households and industries depend daily. In the post-reform
framework, the role of the State continues to be that of a referential planner and entity
responsible for providing the necessary stimuli for energy market development, making
energy security and climate change mitigation measures dependent on the private sector
making the necessary investment in new energy infrastructure (Kuzemko 2016, 115).
The latter has been demonstrated in the negotiations that the current government has
carried out to advance in a plan for the withdrawal of thermoelectric plants, whose
success is based on the willingness of the generating companies to recognize their obsoles-
cence; and, not on a government decision or the environmental damage they cause in the
different slaughter zones.
Precisely, it is the establishment of investment decisions in the area of energy gener-
ation in private investors without much space for the agency of other groups that Bues
& Gailing identifies as marketized (privatization) depoliticization (2016, 86). Although
in the meantime tariff equity initiatives were promoted and failed attempts to promote dis-
tributed generation, these have not been successful nor do they change the logic of private
definition of the final locations of generation projects through environmental approval.
These decisions are in turn determined by the needs of large consumers such as copper
mining, which is expected to increase its energy demand by 32% to 38% by 2028
(COCHILCO 2017; Furnaro 2019).
This type of organization of public services is far from strange in Chile and is replicated
for fields such as the provision of drinking water and sewage and telecommunications
(Tecklin, Bauer, and Prieto 2011). The fundamental idea behind the whole neoliberal ideol-
ogy of the Chilean model is faith in the efficiency of the market and the assumption of pol-
itical neutrality of its mechanisms, which presents the paradox of being a highly
ideologized argument that ignores the institutional framework of operation of the
markets (Prieto and Bauer 2012). This becomes evident in concentrated markets such as
the energy one, where the power of the corporate elites takes even more strength.
3.2. Technocratic depoliticization: renewal and permanence of expert energy
agencies
In matters of high technical content such as energy, the privatization of the sector is usually
accompanied by institutional depoliticization (Flinders and Buller 2006), marked by the
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establishment of government decision-making in essentially technocratic or independent
bodies far from public scrutiny and transparency. This condition is not contradictory
with the marketized depoliticization, but it indicates that the attributions or functions
that the state continues to hold, are delegated to these entities, whose decisions are justified
after considerations of a technical or expert nature (Hay 2007; Bues and Gailing 2016;
Kuzemko 2016).
The pre-eminence of the technocratic approach has a long tradition in Chile. The del-
egation of the management of the social and problematic core of public affairs to expert
bodies is identified as one of the central axes of the strengthening of the neo-liberal
system and depoliticization in the country context (Silva 1991, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011;
Huneeus 2000; Budds 2009; Ureta 2017). This technocratic management is based precisely
on the idea of constructing a technified society where the most capable adopt the special-
ized decisions, limiting the political system to evaluating and assigning to the technocracy
the responsibility of employing logical procedures for the resolution of the problems (Silva
1991, 2011; Huneeus 2000; Budds 2009).
In the energy field, this trend began even before DFL N°4 (LGSE) came into force,
with the creation of the National Energy Commission (CNE) in 1978 by Decree-Law |
No. 2,224. At first, the military dictatorship entrusted its management to one of its most
trusted men, General Herman Brady, who directed it until the end of the dictatorship in
1990. Legally, its status corresponded to a legal person under private law, functionally
decentralized and with its own capital. The central objective of the CNE was to draw up
and coordinate development plans, policies and standards for the proper functioning and
development of the sector, ensure compliance with them and advise the government on
all energy-related matters. One of its most significant actions at the outset was the prep-
aration of DFL N°4 of 1982.
In 2010, the Ministry of Energy was created (Law 20.402/2010), separating the public
policy functions that remain in the Ministry from those related to the regulatory area main-
tained by the CNE. Previously, energy matters were linked to the Ministry of Mining. Until
then, the CNE had played an important role in defining energy policy guidelines in the face
of the various crises experienced during the droughts of 1998/99 and the shift towards
natural gas-based generation, as well as the Argentine gas crisis and the installation of
LNG terminals (Raineri 2007; CNE 2017). Despite the reform, the CNE would continue
to monitor and project the current and expected performance of the energy sector and
advise the Government through the Ministry on all matters related to the energy sector
for its better development. Along with the area of general and technical regulations, the
CNE would continue to be the body that defines, from the technical point of view, projects
for expanding the energy transmission system and energy prices among other central topics
for the operation of the energy sector.
Another relevant entity in the operation of the energy sector was the Centro de Despa-
cho Económico de Carga (Economic cargo dispatch center) (CDEC). To this figure created
by DFL N°4 corresponded the coordination of the interconnected operation of the gener-
ating plants and transmission lines. The CDECs were private entities, whose boards were
composed of representatives of the energy generation and transportation companies.
Diverse and gradual regulations established the obligation of integrating it for a great
part of the distribution and transmission companies. In 1993, the already existing
CDEC-SIC (Central Interconnected System) was joined by the CDEC-SING (Great
North Interconnected System), which operated autonomously.
In addition to these, a “Panel of Experts” created by Law No. 19.940/2004. This body,
made up of seven professionals (five of whom must be engineers or graduates in economic
182 C. Flores-Fernández
sciences and two lawyers with extensive professional or academic experience in technical,
legal or economic energy matters), is responsible for issuing pronouncements on discre-
pancies related to technical reports on the transmission expansion plans, conflicts over
acts of coordination of the system and other energy discrepancies with a high and
complex technical content (Panel de Expertos 2014)
The structure and functions of the CNE and the CDECs were affected by the regu-
lations promoted by the new public energy policies since 2014. During the processing
of the new law on electric power block concessions (Law 20.805/2015), there were a dis-
cussion on whether the process should continue to be handled by the energy distribution
companies, be handed over to the CDECs or remain under the control of the CNE. The
decision taken was to hand over the design, coordination and direction of the bids to the
CNE. This decision was based on the idea of giving the State a predominant role in
guiding and regulating the energy market, because of its public service nature, but to
place it in its technical agencies (CNE 2017). Despite the new role given to the CNE,
the distribution companies retained their role in managing and executing the processes.
The Law that established a new electricity transmission system (Law N°20.936/2016)
also brought about changes. This law, which responded to one of the central axes of the
new public energy policy regarding “connectivity for energy development”, made it poss-
ible to interconnect the two main national electricity systems (SING-SIG) and to replace
the challenged CDECs with an “Independent Coordinator of the National Electricity
System” (the “Coordinator” or “CEN”). This new entity was conceived as a technical
and independent organism, in charge of the coordination of the operation of the National
Electric System (SEN) facilities that operate interconnected between them (CNE 2017).
One of the advantages of interconnection is that it would allow greater integration of
NCRE located in the north of the country.
Under the new regulation, the planning of the processing is handed over to the techni-
cal management of the CNE and the Coordinator. The Ministry of Energy would prepare
long-term energy scenarios (30 years) and the CNE would plan for 20 years, but the effec-
tive planning procedure begins with the proposal submitted annually by the Coordinator to
the CNE. On the basis of this proposal, the CNE prepares a technical report that can be
commented upon, after which a final technical report is prepared. The Panel of Experts
can resolve any subsequent observations. If there are no observations, the Ministry of
Energy will set the extension works of the transmission systems based on the CNE’s
report for its subsequent private tender. In their genesis, expansion plans depend largely
on the identification of electricity generators.14
This new scenario, beyond the greater visibility that the Ministry of Energy has
acquired especially between 2014 and 2016 under the command of former Minister
Pacheco, has implied the prevalence of the management of technocratic agencies in the
government’s work related to energy and the already described characteristics of the
energy sector (private monopolies and oligopolies). This delegation of the decision-
making function is what Bues and Gailing (2016) and Kuzemko (2016) define as the
expression of technocratic (governmental-delegation) depoliticization of energy issues.
One of the consequences of this delegation is a detriment to the transparency and direct
social accountability of decisions (Bues and Gailing 2016, 86) and the conception of
energy as an area far from the majority discussion, from the area of political discussion
and social contingency. These characteristics flow from the parameters on which decisions
are usually defined, where politics should not interfere in economic matters such as energy
(Silva 2008, 2011; Budds 2009; Kuzemko 2016, 117). Another consequence of presenting
energy decisions as merely technical matters is to discourage the agency of sectors of
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society that could be overwhelmed by their complexity and lack of knowledge about the
functioning of the electricity system (Rosenow, Platt, and Flanagan 2013). This disconnec-
tion between energy, politics and society becomes a strategy for civil society to conceive of
themselves as mere recipients and consumers of energy services (Kuzemko 2016), instead
of potential active agents empowered to change towards alternative socio-energetic futures.
This undisputed pre-eminence of expert thinking extends to various instances of the energy
decision-making process, as will be illustrated in the following section.
3.3. Non-deliberative depoliticization: the contours of consensus and participation
The energy transition processes are usually conceived as instances to redefine the dynamics
and energy systems (Burke and Stephens 2018) and germ of construction of common and
innovative visions towards “more sustainable” futures in the long term (Rotmans, Kemp,
and Van Asselt 2001; Schot and Geels 2008; Bues and Gailing 2016; Gailing 2016; Ureta
2017; Alvial-Palavicino and Opazo-Bunster 2018). In this sense, the possibility of a demo-
cratic and participatory co-creation process is important in the definition of the long-term
policy design towards such a transition (Hendriks 2009; Van den Bosch 2010; Stirling
2014; Chilvers and Longhurst 2016).
The new Energy Policy 2050 of 2015 raised the declared intention to differentiate itself
from previous processes and advance in a greater social inclusion in the matter (Min.
Energia 2014; Alvial-Palavicino and Opazo-Bunster 2018). Previously, in general terms,
public participation within the energy sector was seen in advance as an irrelevant aspect
and based on other services or areas, mainly those related to the environmental evaluation
of projects (Ureta 2017). The new participatory approach or participatory turn (Ureta
2017; Urquiza et al. 2018) considered the formation of a “Consultative Committee”15
focused on building a common vision for the energy sector (Roadmap 2050) that would
allow the development of a long-term energy policy with social legitimacy (Min.
Energia 2015, 10). This social legitimacy would come from the generation, within a parti-
cipatory process, of a broad consensus regarding the long-term energy strategy, which
would emerge from within a socially representative body of the various sectors of
society (Ureta 2017; Alvial-Palavicino and Opazo-Bunster 2018).
It should be noted that the creation of this consensus on long-term orientation and terms
of action was the central axis of the elaboration of the roadmap (Alvial-Palavicino and
Opazo-Bunster 2018). In the case of the Energy Policy 2050, the defined consensus
goal corresponded to reaching 70% of electricity production from renewable energies by
2050 (Min. Energia 2015; Alvial-Palavicino and Opazo-Bunster 2018; Urquiza et al.
2018). The agreement within the Committee on how to reach this goal was based on
work scenarios built on the basis of demand and energy cost projections to adopt the
most conservative option. As Alvial-Palavicino and Opazo-Bunster (2018) and Urquiza
et al. (2018) show, these scenarios were used to check the feasibility of the goals previously
determined by the Committee. This limited the options to a mere reproduction of present
and future patterns, excluding the possibility of considering other alternatives for the elec-
tricity sector, such as decentralized or distributed generation systems.16
Within these parameters, dissent was reduced to the choice between the various pro-
jected future scenarios, by which the contours of the previously defined goal were
defined from the technical approach. As a consequence, the dimensions that went
beyond technical-economic and market considerations in the elaboration of the new
public policy guidelines were excluded. The way to make this decision-making system
viable was the result of the selection of actors carried out by the Ministry of Energy,
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those who in principle shared or were inclined to the common goal (Avelino and
Rotmans 2009; Rotmans and Loorbach 2009; Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016). This is
evident in the selection of the NGOs that take part in the Consultative Committee (those
that have the function of being representative of civil society), where preference was
given to those that were seen as technical partners to the detriment of those with strong
political commitment between local environmental movements and citizens (Alvial-Pala-
vicino and Opazo-Bunster 2018).
The original design of the 2050 energy policymaking process considered the incor-
poration of citizen perspectives in the definition of the roadmap. However, its actual
implementation meant that these were only incorporated later as a means of validating
the Committee’s work, without reflecting new expectations or values (Alvial-Palavicino
and Opazo-Bunster 2018). All this means that the political and transformative potential of
a transition process is inhibited, preventing the approach of innovative energy develop-
ment approaches, prevailing neoliberal and market visions (Avelino and
Rotmans 2009; Rotmans and Loorbach 2009; Bues and Gailing 2016; Kenis, Bono,
and Mathijs 2016; Kuzemko 2016).
Applying the categories used by Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs (2016) to the case of
Chilean energy policy, it is possible to identify the characteristics of a post-political con-
dition. This is because the openness of the transition process was limited by the idea of
achieve a consensus, where conflict and dissent was reduced to the debate on technocrati-
cally defined scenarios. This tendency is common to all transition management processes,
where a distinction is made between a shared general vision or goal (consensus) and a mul-
tiplicity of strategies to achieve it (dissent) (Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016, 575). Both the
goal and the strategies are supported by a notion of a common good that is pre-established
from a normative approach and privileges expert knowledge (Ureta 2017; Urquiza et al.
2018; Alvial-Palavicino and Opazo-Bunster 2018). With this, no space is given to alterna-
tive visions, eliminating the political dimension inherent to the debate on transition. The
desired representativeness of the new policy is submerged in a mere slogan. In practice,
this participation is restricted to actors with a common vision, and citizen opinion is
limited to a mechanism for validating options that do not innovate outside the current fra-
mework, i.e. a centralized energy system based on dynamic market logic.
It is precisely these features of the elaboration of the Energy Roadmap and Policy 2050
that make it possible to identify it as a manifestation of non-deliberative or denial depoli-
ticization by resulting in the reduction of “capacity for politics as deliberation and as choice
between different solutions to problems” rejecting “other voices that recommended more
profound government involvement or change” (Kuzemko 2016, 118–119). What ulti-
mately prevails as official discourse is the uncontested need to carry out the energy tran-
sition (NCRE promotion) from the approach of economic variables, without questioning
the prevailing market logic, thereby restricting the space of civil society to co-determine
the process (Bues and Gailing 2016, 88) and propose alternative patterns of development
and energy futures.
4. Discussion
In this paper we have sought to operationalize the theoretical and analytical approach to
depoliticization in the study of the Chilean energy transition process. The above allows
us to argue that both before the start of the transition process initiated in 2014 and in
the subsequent period, it is possible to identify a post-political condition in the Chilean
energy sector. This condition is based on the operationalization of various forms of
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depoliticization described. This explains that despite advancing in an energy transition
from the technological perspective with the entry of NCRE to the matrix, a transition is
not materialized in the social or political aspects related to energy.
In this way, energy decisions continue in the hands of private monopolistic and oligo-
polistic actors, who with the permission of the State define the location of projects without
effective processes of citizen participation beyond the -often testimonial- instances of
environmental qualification. This is the expression of marketized (societal) depoliticiza-
tion. The powers of the State in this area refer to referential definitions based on techno-
cratic considerations emanating from equally technocratic public bodies, whose
decisions are difficult to scrutinize from a political perspective and with little margin for
participation. This is a clear expression of the technocratic or governmental depoliticiza-
tion. The real definition of the priorities and guidelines of the development model of the so-
called energy transition is linked to processes that, despite the declared of a participatory
turn, are limited to a small group of pre-selected actors and the reproduction of technocratic
and market considerations within the framework of the sustainable development discourse
and the unquestionable need for the energy transition towards a renewable energy matrix.
In this way, the potential contained in the transition processes to really modify energy
systems becomes illusory, leaving the discussion on the various ways of imagining the
future of energy and the role of the various actors in its definition. This last aspect, man-
ifested in the elaboration of the roadmap and energy policy and 2050, is the characteristic
feature of non-deliberative depoliticization, which is difficult to dissociate from the tech-
nocratic aspect of depoliticization.
One of the characteristics of the Chilean energy transition has been the clear option for
the invisibility of ideological disputes and debates, replacing them with techno-managerial
(public-?) private planning, expert management and consensual participatory processes.
Under this scenario, citizens continue to be treated as mere passive clients and the local
communities where the projects are located as agents without voice or vote, who are
only called to form part of formal instances of participation that only seek to legitimize
the decisions already adopted that do not directly or indirectly benefit them.
The transition of the fossil pattern that dominates the energy life of the Southern Cone
is driven by the “green-friendly” discourse of advancing towards the de-carbonization of
the matrix fighting against climate change, but hides depoliticization dynamics and a
post political condition of an energy transition of transforming character. The success of
the Chilean Energy Policy lies precisely in the fulminant incorporation of NCRE energies.
In this way, Chile is presented as a model to follow in terms of climate change and substi-
tution of fossil fuels with wind, small hydro and solar technologies. However, there are
concerns about how green the Chilean matrix is, if the share of fossil fuels does not
decrease, or how clean is the energy transition in Chile if CO2 emissions do not stop
increasing. All this in a policy of energy security, with imports of coal and natural gas
on the rise and a role for the State as guarantor and promoter of adequate conditions to
private investment in the energy sector. Is what former minister Pacheco defines as the
energy revolution (Pacheco 2018), what really happens in Chile?.
The root problems, radicalized in the strategic analyses of the Chilean energy transition
-driven by progressive, center-left and right-wing governments-, do not account for the
political problems, but seek to overlook them for the greater good of economic growth
based on the market and badly called sustainable development. In this way, the maelstrom
of the green economy and the transition to sustainability is a depoliticized strategy of socio-
ecological transformations. Assimilating the de-politicization and post-political condition
of the energy transition in the Chilean case, invites us to appreciate the incredible resilience
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of modern capitalist States with the unsustainability of their socio-natural metabolisms.
The greenwashing of the strategy, based only on changes in the electrical energy matrix,
reproduces the same market dynamics and privatization, now with carbon credits as a
way of financing nature, technological dependencies and replicating enclave economies
in the territories (solar and wind and in the north, wind and hydroelectric in the center
and south). This shows us that a transformation towards sustainability is not underway,
or at least, inside very discussible terms.
In this context, the so-called “Chilean energy revolution” (Pacheco 2018) can indeed
be considered a revolution, but a “passive revolution” in Gramscian terms (Wanner
2015; Neusteurer 2016; Brand, Görg, and Wissen 2020). This, since it has allowed to
renew the dominant discourse of sustainable development and capitalist hegemony
within the current framework of environmental, climate and global development crisis
(Wanner 2015; Brand and Wissen 2017; Brand, Görg, and Wissen 2020).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the closure of the debate on the model of future
energy development and its replacement by the imposition of technocratic and market
visions does not silence the essence and origin of their demand. As Mouffe points out,
“it is not enough to eliminate the political in its dimension of antagonismand exclusion
from one’s theory to make it vanish from the real world. It does come back, and with a
vengeance” (2000, 31). The symptom of this is reflected in cases of repoliticization and
resistance that we can find beyond the energy spectrum, as has been demonstrated since
October 2019 in Chile. As for the energy field this is expressed in the questioning of
the parameters of “sustainable” energy development (Kelly et al. 2017; Natho 2017;
Kelly 2019) and the growing conflict and resistance that NCRE projects generate in the
territories and among local communities (INDH 201817).
5. Conclusions
Since 2014, the definition of a long-term energy future has been a central issue in the public
policy debate. However, the promotion of various public policy instruments and energy
regulations that have allowed the advance of NCRE in the energy matrix has gone hand
in hand with the continuation of depoliticization mechanisms that perpetuate a centralized,
privatized, technocratic and non-deliberative energy system.
Even though the innovations introduced in the sector have allowed the entry of new
actors in energy generation and promoted NCRE, the development of energy infrastructure
continues to depend on private will, which is organized in monopolistic and oligopolistic
structures. State participation has sought to be reoriented to have a greater interference, but
the cosmetic reforms do not change the model of the sector based on a highly depoliticized
technocratic and private management. The proposed new energy approach announced a
participatory definition of the energy roadmap to 2050, nevertheless, its formation process-
shows the prevalence of a non-deliberative depoliticization, limiting the effective partici-
pation of new actores and the progress and visibility of alternative energy futures to those
mapped out beforehand from an “expert” option based on stimulating the NCRE market.
In view of the above is that we can understand how and why the process of energy tran-
sition in Chile, despite its good international reputation, is far from being a revolutionary
project as it has promoted the entry of NCRE in the electricity matrix without changing the
structure of the sector, production and consumption patterns of energy or encourage the
development of a more democratic, decentralized or distributed system. This scenario
limits the range of action of the State in energy matters, making it difficult to achieve
real progress towards decentralized and truly sustainable systems, both environmentally
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and socially. It also generates the seed for the resurgence of resistance and crisis that will
clamor for the need for a real and deep re-politicization of the discussion on a common and
truly transformative energy future.
Notes
1. The Chilean law indicates that NCRE correspond to small hydroelectric plants (less than 20MW
of maximum power), and projects that take advantage of biomass, geothermal, solar, wind
and marine energy, among others (Law No. 20257 of 2008). This definition excludes large
hydroelectric plants due to the high social and environmental impacts of the infrastructure of
the reservoirs and the strong presence that they have historically had in the Chilean electricity
matrix.
2. Within the national context, Al Gore’s presentation at Climate Action 2016 in Washington DC
is constantly highlighted. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnXhTggl3RE
3. Similar to the context of transformations as “new critical orthodoxy” proposed by Brand (2016).
4. Bues & Gailing explores the “ways of linking the concepts of governmentality and depolitici-
zation in order to incorporate both actor- and non-actor-based power shifts in the study of
energy transitions” (2016, 69).
5. This comparison is made in order to contrast the progress, in terms of participation and political
legitimacy that the energy transition discourse has pretended to have in contrast to the scenario
that preceded it.
6. This comparison is made in order to contrast the progress, in terms of participation and political
legitimacy, that the energy transition discourse has pretended to have in contrast to the scenario
that preceded it.
7. The subsidiary role of the State implies that “the State does not act or decide as long as there are
persons, organizations and intermediate institutions of society that are capable of acting and
deciding at their level, in the most varied fields” (CNE 2017).
8. The military government’s position is summarized in the statements of its Finance
Minister Hernan Buchi quoted by Tecklin, Bauer, and Prieto 2011 “In Chile there had to be...
a complete sweep within all the sectors of the economy to remove the statist weed. That was
what gave the Chilean economic revolution so much significance, range and depth” (Büchi
1993, 64).
9. Regulated customers were those with connected power below 5000 kWor above 500 kW who
have not opted for the system of free customers (they have little negotiating capacity). Free cus-
tomers would be those who have a connected power greater than 2000 kW and can directly
agree on the price of their electrical energy with generators. For more information on the
pricing structure, see CNE (2017).
10. This is done through the National Energy Commission (CNE) and the Superintendence of Elec-
tricity and Fuel (SEC).
11. For more detail on the history of the Chilean energy sector see Vergara (2004), Fischer and
Serra (2004) and Proaño (2015).
12. These regulations are based on the occurrence of various events such as the drought of 1998/
1999, which implied a turn towards stimulating the import of Argentine gas and thermoelectric
generation based on natural gas. Subsequently, the Argentine gas crisis and the cutback in
imports motivated the focus on diesel-based thermoelectric generation, which revealed
the urgency of diversifying the energy matrix and promoting alternatives to take advantage
of the incipient removable potential, but without implying an explicit long-term energy
policy. More information on these processes can be found in CNE (2017) and Simsek et al.
(2019).
13. If the prices of the 2013 bid are considered, the price was reduced by more than 75% and would
mean a reduction in the energy accounts of regulated users by 2024 (CNE 2017).
14. Chapter III of the DFL N°382 modified by Law N°20.936
15. This Committee was made up of 27 members selected by the Ministry of Energy. Eight of its
members were government authorities, seven were NGOs and Civil Society Organizations,
seven were members of academia and five were industry associations.
16. Although regulations were issued in these areas, their absence or low incidence reveals the low
priority that the public and private worlds have given to this type of alternative.
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17. According to the “Map of Socio-environmental Conflicts in Chile” of the National Institute of
Human Rights (Loorbach et al. 2010) of the 116 latent conflicts, 38% are related to the Energy
sector. Although the majority are linked to thermo and large hydroelectric projects, many of
them correspond to NCRE and its associated infrastructure.
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